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Governance is a critical component of the effective management of a nonprofit sport 
organisation. Boards in this governance system play an important role to guide their 
organisations. While a number of agencies have provided documents of what boards should 
perform in their organisations, these documents remain descriptive. Empirical research on 
board roles particularly in a dual board system has been deficient. The purpose of this 
research therefore was to empirically investigate board roles in nonprofit sport organisations 
with a dual board system in Taiwan. 158 directors and 103 supervisors from 24 nonprofit 
sport organisations completed questionnaire regarding board roles. Two factor analyses were 
conducted. A 20-variable/4-factor scale of roles of directors and a 9-variable/2-factor scale of 
roles of supervisors were generated. Several conclusions were made based on results of this 
study.      
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Board Roles in Nonprofit Sport Organisations with a Dual Board System 
 
INTRODUCTION 
      
Governance has been identified as an influential dimension in the relative performance of 
sport organisations because of its pivotal role in setting policy and direction for the 
organisation (Ferkins, Shilbury, & McDonald, 2005; Hoye, 2006; Hoye & Auld, 2001). In a 
governance system, the board carries the critical responsibility of ensuring that the activities 
of the organisation are carried out in the best interests of the organisation (Australian Sports 
Commission, 2005). The importance of governance has been well-recognized by government 
bodies that fund and support sport organisations and by sport organisations themselves, and 
models of good governance are eagerly sought. While there are a number of prescribed rules 
outlining the parameters of board roles in sport organisations (Australian Sports Commission, 
2005; European Olympic Committee, 2001), the ‘real’ roles of board members of sport 
organisations may or may not be similar to these generic descriptions. Empirical 
investigations of board governance in sport organisations have recently began to emerge as 
the industry tries to grapple with the nuances of board governance (Ferkins et al., 2005; 
Forster, 2006; Inglis, 1997; Shilbury, 2001). This work is important as it has provided a 
framework of how boards perform in sport organisations.  
     However, research to date as only examined board roles of nonprofit sport organisations 
with a unitary board; that is where there is only a board of directors. Board roles of nonprofit 
sport organisations with a dual board system, namely where there is a board of directors and a 
board of supervisors, have not been examined. The purpose of the current research was to 
empirically investigate the dual system and the roles of both directors and supervisors in 
nonprofit sport organisations to better understand this form of governance.  
BOARD ROLES 
 
Researchers from different disciplines have provided information regarding board roles, 
including, board roles in profit organisations, (Blair, 1995; Clarkson, 1995; Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Huse, 2005; Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999), nonprofit 
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organisations (Cadbury, 2002; Carver, 1997; Houle, 1989; Pointer & Orlikoff, 2002) and 
sport organisations (Australian Sports Commission, 2005). Table 1 summarizes board roles in 
different types of organisations. While these roles are provided by researchers from different 
industries, they share a number of characteristics and have little difference. For example, 
board members are asked to involve in strategy management and to appoint and reward 
executives. In addition, these roles are mainly normative and academic, little research has 
empirically investigated board roles.  
Insert Table 1 Here 
     Empirical investigations of what board members actually do in their sport organisations 
has provided a basis for our current understanding of board roles (Inglis, 1997; Shilbury, 
2001). Inglis’s (1997) study of executive directors, board presidents and board members of 
Canadian Provincial sport organisations and grouped board roles into four factors and 16 
items. The four key roles were: 1. Mission—ethical responsibilities, following charters, and 
keeping policies in line with mission; 2. Planning—financial policy, budget allocations, 
human resources and long-range plans and strategies; 3.Executive Director—hiring and 
monitoring of the executive directors as well as concern for fulfilling legal responsibilities; 
and 4.Community Relations—developing and delivering specific programs and services, 
representing the interest of certain groups, raising funds, and promoting advocacy and 
community relations. Notably, there was a significant difference in the perception of 
importance and performance for the board roles between paid staff and board members and 
male and female members. In Australia, Shilbury (2001) concluded that strategy, developing 
financial policies and budgeting were perceived as the most important board roles in sport 
organisations. Paid staff were found to have influence over issues that were historically the 
purview of the board. These two studies and others have contributed to our understanding of 
board roles in a unitary governance structure; however, we still know little about board roles 
in sport organisations outside Western countries and in those with a dual board system.  
     According to the Civil Organisation Law, Taiwanese nonprofit sport organisations are 
asked to build a board of directors and a board of supervisors. The maximum number of the 
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board of directors of nonprofit sport organisations at the national level is thirty-five. The 
maximum number of the board of supervisors is one-third of the number of the board of 
directors. Board members are elected by organisational members and board chairs are elected 
by board members. The Civil Organisation Law does not stipulate the roles of the board of 
directors and the board of supervisors but request civil organisations to regulate these roles.  
Researchers have called for future studies on nonprofit board governance in Taiwan (Hsiao, 
2000; Tseng, 2002).  
     Moreover, the board structure in China, Germany, Japan, and Netherlands is also 
characterized by a dual board system. One characteristic of the dual board system is that this 
system relies on supervisory board to monitor the board of directors (Rose, 2005). It has 
revealed that insufficient supervision of management can lead to a loss of stakeholder and 
financial scandals, such as Enron and Tyco (Rose, 2005). According to the German Corporate 
Governance Code, the board of directors is responsible for managing its company and the 
supervisory board provides supervision and advice. Both boards are separated from each other 
(Nietsch, 2005). People in German usually expect that supervisors play a role in monitoring 
organisations. Therefore, when a company fails, supervisors are usually been criticized 
regardless of whether or not the criticism is right (Schilling, 2001). In addition, Cooke and 
Sawa (1998) studied governance structure of profit organisations in Japan. Under Japanese 
Commercial Code, companies should have a board of directors and a board of supervisor. The 
status of the board of supervisors is similar to the board of directors. Companies are asked to 
have three or more statutory auditors (supervisors) if these companies whose amount of 
capital is and more than 500 million yen. While there is an increasing research into 
organisations with dual board system (Cooke & Sawa, 1998; Dahya, Karbhari, Xiao & Yang, 
2003; Maassen & van den Bosch, 1999; Rose, 2005; Schilling, 2001), more research is 
needed (Dahya et al., 2003; Turnbull, 1997). Particularly, among these few studies, little 
attention is placed on nonprofit organisations with a dual board system. Thus, using the 
existing literature as foundational knowledge we investigated the nature of board roles in the 
dualistic board system found in Taiwanese nonprofit sport organisations.  
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METHODOLOGY 
The National Council of Physical Fitness and Sports, R.O.C. (Taiwan) lists 70 nonprofit sport 
organisations established according to Taiwan’s Civil Organisation Law. All these 
organisation have a board of directors and a board of supervisors. All 70 organisations were 
contacted and 24 organisations demonstrated their willingness to participate in this research. 
A questionnaire of board roles was devised based on Inglis, Alexander and Weaver’s (1999) 
framework. The instrument contains three factors and 14 roles which were developed from 
previous literature and from personal work experience (Axelrod, 1994; Bradshaw et al., 1992; 
Carver, 1990; Dunlop, 1989; Harris, 1993; Harvey & Zamparo, 1994; Heimovics & Herman, 
1990; Herman, 1985; Houle, 1989; Inglis, 1997; Widmer, 1993). Data on the gender, age and 
education of respondents and yeas of service on the board were also collected to delineate the 
profile of respondents. 
     The questionnaire was initially designed in English and then translated into the local 
language through backward and forward translations (Hayashi, Suzuki, & Sasaki, 1992). A 
focus group interview was then conducted to assess content and clarity of the questionnaire. 
Two directors, two supervisors and two general secretaries from six different nonprofit sport 
organisations were invited and asked to provide feedback on the questionnaire. Modifications 
to the questionnaire were made by the researcher based on interviewees’ comments. As a 
result, the questionnaire of roles of directors had 21 questions; 10 questions about the roles of 
supervisors. A pilot was conducted and further modifications were made to improve the 
wording and clarity of the questionnaire. Participants of the focus group interview and pilot 
were not included in the following data collection phase. The final version was distributed to 
directors and supervisors via the participating organisations in December, 2006. Respondents 
completed questionnaires with 5-point scales (1=Strongly Disagree) to measure the degree 
they fulfilled each roles. A total of 158 directors and 103 supervisors completed the survey.       
     This study was part of a large research and factor analysis was the first stage of this large 
research. 24 organisations from 70 organisations listed by the National Council of Physical 
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Fitness and Sports, R.O.C. (Taiwan) took part in the first stage. 25 organisations from the 
same 70 organisations participated in the following stages of this research. 202 directors and 
102 supervisors from these 25 organisations took part in the research and they could be 
viewed as non-respondents for the first stage. The chi-square test was conducted to compare 
respondents and non-respondents in terms of three demographic data, including gender, age 
and education level. Chi-square analysis showed there was no significant difference between 
directors and supervisors from two research stages respectively.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Within the 24 nonprofit sport organisations the total number of directors and supervisors were 
710 and 220 respectively. We obtained valid questionnaire responses from 158 directors 
(22.2%) and 103 (46.8%) supervisors. The characteristics of respondents are summarized in 
Table 2. Directors were mainly male (93.7%) with only 6.3% female directors (n=10). 
Similarly, the majority of supervisors were male (n=95) with 92.2% and female supervisors 
(n=8) only 7.8%. The majority of directors and supervisors were over the age of 50 years 
(65.8 % and 65.1 % respectively). The number of directors and supervisors under the age of 
34 years was minimal.                            
Insert Table 2 Here 
     More than half of directors (65.1%) and supervisors (62.1%) had held their position over 
four years. The most common duration categories were 1 year to under 4 years together with 
the 4 years-under 8 years for directors.  For supervisors 1 years-4 years was most common, 
followed by 4 years- under 8 years. The data indicated that most directors and supervisors did 
not hold their positions for more than 8 years. In other words, most board members were 
elected for two consecutive terms. Regarding education level 27.3 percent of directors and 
27.2 percent of supervisors reported high school was their highest level of education and 34.2 
percent of directors and 23.3 percent of supervisors had got a higher degree than the 
college/university degree. Overall, most board members regardless of directors (72.8%) or 
supervisors (68.9%) had higher education qualifications. Chi-square analysis of gender (χ2 (1) 
=.201, p=.654), age (χ2 (6) =.926, p= .988), duration (χ2 (4) =2.152, p=.708) and education 
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(χ2 (3) =3.15, p=.654) found that there was no significant difference between directors and 
supervisors.  
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)—Roles of Directors 
      
     Exploratory factor analysis was conducted since the questionnaires developed for this 
study had not been tested in the target population. Principal component analysis was 
employed to extract factors. Factors whose eigenvalue over 1.0 were retained. Accordingly, 
four factors were retained. Factor 1 explains 43.81 percent of total variance; the 4 retained 
factors all represented 67.19 percent of the variance of 21 variables.  
     A direct oblique rotation was conducted to generate factor loadings which indicate the 
correlation between an original variable and its factor. A higher loading represents a strong 
relationship between variables. For interpretation purposes, researchers can choose factor 
loading with an absolute value of .40 or greater (Field, 2005; Pett, Lackey & Sullivan, 2003; 
Steven, 2002). One variable failed to load significantly on any factors and it was eliminated 
(Pett et al., 2002). After deleting these one variable, there were 20 variables remained and the 
model was changed. Therefore, there was a need to re-calculate the factor loadings (Hair et al., 
2006). 
   Table 3 describes the second round of the factor analysis of roles of directors. Four factors 
were again retained. The percentage explained by each of four factors was 43.34%, 10.45%, 
7.93% and 5.68 % respectively. Variables all had factor loadings above .40. The overall 
Cronbach α was .926. Within each of these scales, the α ranged from .664 to .911. These 
coefficients were considered to be satisfactory (Hair et al., 2006). In addition, the highest 
correlation coefficient between factors was .560. It was therefore to warrant oblique rotation 
again (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).                                     
Insert Table 3 Here 
The first factor explains 43.34 percent of the variance and has eight roles. It contains 
allocating the annual budget, ensuring a vision, assessing the annual plan, ensuring a mission, 
examining the overall strategy, assessing the financial policy, assessing sport services 
provided to members/society and responding to members/community needs. The first factor 
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focuses on roles regarding organisational tasks. They are fundamental roles that directors 
perform to make their organisations function. Therefore the first factor is named as Task. The 
second factor is named Board Meetings. Three roles, electing permanent board, electing the 
board chairman and attending regularly the board meeting, are all related to the board 
meetings. The three roles account for 10.45 percent of variance.   
     The third factor has seven roles and account for 7.93 percent of variance. Roles in the third 
factor concern with how directors govern the general secretary and how directors govern 
themselves. Assigning work to the general secretary, evaluating the general secretary’s 
performance, hiring the general secretary and ratifying decisions made by the general 
secretary in hiring paid staff are about governing the general secretary. Directors evaluate 
their own performance, raise funds for their organisations and ratify directors’ resignation are 
self management of directors. Therefore, this factor was named as General 
Secretary/Directors Management. 
     The last factor explains 5.68 percent of variance. This factor includes two roles with a 
focus on identifying and satisfying the needs of members and society. The two roles are 
intertwined since the organisation’s members and society are the target population and both 
are viewed as stakeholders of nonprofit sport organisations. A nonprofit sport organisation is 
established to serve its stakeholders and provide services to them (Blair, 1995; Clark, 1998). 
Therefore it is labels as Stakeholder.  
EFA—Roles of Supervisors  
 
     Table 4 presents the factor matrix for roles of supervisors. Principal component was 
employed to extract factors. Factors whose eigenvalue over 1.0 were retained. Direct Oblimin 
rotation was again employed to rotate matrix. There were two factors having eigenvalues 
greater than 1. Factor 1 explains 52.51 percent of total variance; Factor 2 accounted for 10.48 
percent of total variance. The two factors represented 62.98 percent of the variance of 10 
variables. Variables with a factor loading of .40 and above were considered. One variable had 
a cross loading on Factor 1 and Factor 2. Kline (2000) suggested that because of difficulty in 
interpreting the scale, cross-loading variables should be eliminated. In addition, Hair et al. 
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(2006) argued that researchers should take action on variables with cross loading. Possible 
actions include ignoring the cross-loading and deleting cross-loading. These cross loadings 
were too significant to be ignored. Therefore, the action taken by this research was to remove 
this variable. After deleting one variable, there were nine variables remained and the model 
was changed. Therefore, there was a need to re-calculate the factor loadings. 
   Table 4 describes the second round of the factor analysis of roles of directors. Two factors 
were again retained. The percentage explained by each of two factors was 53.16% and 
11.59% respectively. Variables all had factor loadings above .40 and cross loadings were not 
found. The overall Cronbach α was .885. Within each of these scales, the α were .867 
and .770 respectively. These coefficients were considered to be satisfactory. In addition, the 
correlation coefficient between two factors was 0.605. It was therefore to warrant oblique 
rotation again (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).                       
Insert Table 4 Here 
     The first factor explains 53.16 percent of the variance and included five roles that are 
concerned with whether funds and properties are used properly, reviewing annual budgets, 
reviewing final accounts, and ratifying supervisors’ resignation. It therefore is labeled as 
Funds/Supervisors Monitor. Factor 2 explains 11.59 percent of the various and consisted of 
four roles and includes regularly attending board meetings, electing permanent supervisors, 
presenting supervising results in the general conference and presenting supervising results in 
board meetings. As these roles pertain to the overall organisation—making all members know 
how well organisational funds have been used by the board of directors and the general 
secretary. Supervisors themselves also complete two compulsory organisational activities. It 
is appropriate to label this factor as Mission.   
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
     Several observations can be made based on this study. First, the survey data generated four 
factors of roles of directors and two factors of roles of supervisors. The roles of directors and 
supervisors in a dual board system appear to be different. Overall, the main role played by 
directors is to help organisations function; supervisors were mostly involved in monitoring 
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tasks. Compared to supervisors, directors work more closely with the secretary/executive 
department. Most roles supervisors perform are to supervise the “team” formed by directors 
and the secretary’s department and are not involved in managerial activities. The board of 
supervisors assumes the role of a “third party” in order to not become part of the team and 
supervise the team independently. Organisations with a dual board system can use this 
information to accordingly design training courses for both current and new board members 
to more effectively perform their roles. Second, there are some differences in roles of 
directors between the dual board system and the unitary system. For example, assigning work 
to the general secretary and electing the board chairman are performed by directors in a dual 
board system and was not identified in Inglis et al.’s (1999) framework and previous literature. 
Similarly, some roles of supervisors, such as supervising whether properties are bought and 
used properly, were not found in Inglis et al.’s (1999) framework nor in previous literature 
based on a unitary board system. Our study found that roles of board in a unitary board 
system can not be fully applied to those in a dual board system.      
     Third, several roles, such as electing the board chairman and attending board meeting, are 
performed by both directors and supervisors. This suggests that board members do actually 
conduct the descriptive roles described by Taiwan’s Civil Organisation Law. Forth, this 
research also shows that the board of directors is a “firewall” to protect organisations from 
being misled by the secretary/executive department and the board of supervisors is a “final 
firewall” to defend organisations from being misgoverned by the “team”. That is, there is a 
“dual protection system” in the dual board system. Organisations with a unitary board system 
have no internal mechanism to monitor directors. And what organisations can do is to trust 
directors (Mason, Thibault, & Misener, 2006). Therefore, the main feature differentiating 
these two board systems is whether directors are supervised by an internal system. Finally, the 
results demonstrate that there is no significant difference in board composition between 
directors and supervisors; in other words, the backgrounds of directors and supervisors are not 
different. Directors are also qualified to be elected as supervisors and vice versa. Within 
boards, the majority of board members are male and older than 50 years of age. The reason 
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for this might be related to the fact that in the Chinese society, men are more commonly 
found in business roles. All board members also had a full time job. While being a nonprofit 
board member is not financially compensated the role might assist board members in building 
a business network and furthering their financial potential. In addition, board members are 
required to govern their organisations. It appears that there is an expectation of a substantial 
amount of work and social experience to be obtained before an individual can be considered 
to have the ability to govern. Future research can further investigate the rationale for 
particular board composition and if this is related to board effectiveness. Moreover, results of 
this research could inform the government, public and taxpayers in Taiwan about governance 
practices of nonprofit sport organisations. They can further examine whether nonprofit sport 
organisations are governed properly. Countries who intend to establish a dual board system 
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Table 1 Board Roles in different types of organisations 






• Develop organisation’s missions and policy   
• Ratify strategies 
• Appoint, advice, replace, reward and evaluate CEOs/Managers   
• Oversee managerial activities 
• Report to owners/shareholders 
• Manage the relationship with external environment 
• Advance organisational image 
• Assure related legislations are met  





• Determine organisation’s mission and policy 
• Strategic planning  
• Monitor and assess programs and services 
• Appoint, monitor, evaluate, reward, replace and work with the executive 
• Assure that the organisation meet all legal requirements 
• Secure financial resources and manage financial matters  
• Manage the relationship with external environment 







• Develop, formulate and monitor strategies 
• Formulate Policies  
• Enhance sports organisations’ public image 
• Review and monitor managerial activities and performance 
• Report to members and stakeholders  
• Employ, evaluate, provide advice and reward executives 
• Ensure organisational compliance with related legislations  
• Manage financial resources 
• Develop a risk managing plan 
• Self-assess  
• Initiate board development activities 
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under 1 yr 
1 yr-under 4yrs 
4 yrs- under 8 yrs 
8 yrs- under 10 yrs 
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Allocate the annual budget .809 b .102 -.025 .355 
Ensure a vision .806 -.124 -.090 -.113 
Assess the annual plan .753 .215 .154 -.182 
Ensure a mission .738 -.182 -.106 -.090 
Examine the overall strategy .736 .104 .024 -.254 
Assess the financial policy .702 -.044 -.207 .224 
Assess sport services provided to members/society .670 .046 -.099 -.186 
Respond to members/community needs  .583 -.057 -.247 -.220 
Elect permanent board members -.087 .803 -.162 -.003 
Elect the board chairman  .070 .750 -.174 .202 
Attend regularly the board meeting .067 .663 .157 -.179 
Assign work to the general secretary -.005 -.053 -.865 .043 
Evaluate the general secretary’s performance .024 .169 -.812 -.047 
Hire the general secretary  -.064 .151 -.795 -.199 
Evaluate the board’s performance  .079 .038 -.743 -.008 
Raise funds  .102 -.120 -.634 -.203 
Ratify decisions made by the general secretary in hiring paid staff .335 -.210 -.589 .135 
Ratify directors’ resignation .112 .384 -.542 .203 
Satisfy the need of members/society  .207 .049 -.143 -.742 
Identify the needs of members/society .224 .016 -.285 -.674 
Eigenvalues 8.668 2.089 1.586 1.135 
Percentage variance  43.34 10.45 7.93 5.68 
a Reliability Coefficient 
b Factor Loading
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Review annul budgets .909 b -.106 
Supervise whether funds are used properly .874 -.002 
Review final accounts  .774 .126 
Ratify supervisors’ resignation .726 -.167 
Supervise whether properties are bought and used properly .689 .239 
Attend regularly the board meeting  -.305 .974 
Present supervising results in the general conference  .130 .742 
Present supervising results in the board meeting  .144 .705 
Elect permanent supervisors  .317 .441 
Eigenvalues 4.784 1.043 
Percentage variance  53.16 11.59 
a Reliability Coefficient 
b Factor Loading 
